Hypocrisy and Moral Authority

Jessica Isserow; Colin Klein

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i2.224

Volume 12, Number 2
November 2017

ARTICLE

Hypocrisy and Moral Authority

and

Volume 12, Number 2, November 2017, Pages 191–222

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i2.224

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Abstract

Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person’s moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy within a particular moral community. This status is both socially important and normatively precarious. Hence, moral agents are right to be vigilant when it comes to hypocrisy, and are often justified in their outrage when they detect it. We further argue that our view can preserve what is attractive in rival accounts, while avoiding their associated problems.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.

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