Volume 25, Number 3
September 2023
ARTICLE

How to Be Morally Responsible for Another’s Free Intentional Action

Volume 25, Number 3, September 2023, Pages 545–579
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v25i3.2346
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Abstract

I argue that an agent can be morally responsible and fully (but not necessarily solely) blameworthy for another agent’s free intentional action, simply by intentionally creating the conditions for the action in a way that causes it. This means, I argue, that she can be morally responsible for the other’s action in the relevantly same way that she is responsible for her own non-basic actions. Furthermore, it means that socially mediated moral responsibility for intentional action does not require an agent to authorize another to act on her behalf, nor does it require her to threaten, coerce, or deceive the other.
Copyright © 2023 Olle Blomberg
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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