Are Savior Siblings a Special Case in Procreative Ethics?

Caleb Althorpe; Elizabeth Finneron-Burns

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i1.2623

Volume 26, Number 1
November 2023

ARTICLE

Are Savior Siblings a Special Case in Procreative Ethics?

and

Volume 26, Number 1, November 2023, Pages 49–73

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i1.2623

PDF

Abstract

In this paper we examine three categories of reasons that have been given against the creation of savior siblings (harm to the child, autonomy violations, and effects on wider society) and argue that all can be defeated. We then outline the conditions under which the practice is morally permissible and argue that these conditions are no different from those under which it is ever morally permissible to procreate. Our surprising conclusion is that savior siblings do not present a special case in procreative ethics and it is permissible to create them whenever it is permissible to create any other child.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.

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