Inclusive Blameworthiness and the Wrongfulness of Causing Harm

Evan Tiffany

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v25i3.2359

Volume 25, Number 3
September 2023

ARTICLE

Inclusive Blameworthiness and the Wrongfulness of Causing Harm

Volume 25, Number 3, September 2023, Pages 516–544

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v25i3.2359

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Abstract

This paper takes up the question of whether the consequences of a person’s volitional actions can contribute to their blameworthiness. On the one hand it is intuitively plausible to hold that if A volitionally shoots V with the intention of killing V then A is blameworthy for V’s death. On the other hand, if the only difference between A and B is resultant luck, many find it counter-intuitive to hold that A is more blameworthy than B. There are three broad (non-skeptical) strategies for resolving this tension: accept resultant moral luck, deny that one can be morally responsible for outcomes, or accept that outcomes can be within the scope of things one is morally responsible for while denying that they can affect the degree of blameworthiness. This paper aims to defend resultant moral luck against both the scoping and the internalist strategies by drawing on an “inclusive conception” of blameworthiness, according to which how much blame one deserves is a function of two independent variables: the wrongfulness of the offense and the offender’s degree of moral responsibility. The view defended here holds that consequences affect degree of blameworthiness by affecting the wrongfulness of that for which one is being blamed.

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