Volume 11, Number 3
May 2017
DISCUSSION

Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram

Volume 11, Number 3, May 2017, Pages 1–9
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i3.190
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Abstract

Ingram has argued that the moral fixed points view of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau must be false because it implies conceptual deficiency with moral concepts on behalf of moral philosophers, who are supposedly experts about moral concepts. I argue that moral fixed points theory is actually coherent with the possibility that moral antirealists who deny moral fixed points theory are not conceptually deficient with moral concepts. This is because they might be conceptually competent with moral concepts and reliably grasp moral fixed points at the level of intuitive cognition but resist moral fixed points theory at the reflective level of philosophical argumentation.
Copyright © 2017 Christos Kyriacou
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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