Volume 12, Number 3
December 2017
DISCUSSION

Can We Intend the Past?

Volume 12, Number 3, December 2017, Pages 304–311
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.268
PDFPDF

Abstract

First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace’s account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one’s present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace’s notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality of choice.
Copyright © 2017 Oded Na'aman
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Rationality and Responding to Normative Reasons

Mohamad Hadi Safaei

Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries

Olof Leffler

Famine, Affluence, and Aquinas

Marshall Bierson and Tucker Sigourney

Are All Deceptions Manipulative or All Manipulations Deceptive?

Shlomo Cohen

No Grit Without Freedom

Berislav Marušić

Moral Decision Guides: Counsels of Morality or Counsels of Rationality?

Holly M. Smith

What Is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?

Thomas Crawley

The Importance of Roles in the Skill Analogy

Matt Dougherty

On Keeping Things in Proportion

Adam Lovett and Stefan Riedener

Making Peace with Moral Imperfection: The Problem of Temporal Asymmetry

Camil Golub

Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts

Javier González de Prado Salas

On Ex Ante Contractualism

Korbinian Rüger

Portico