Volume 14, Number 2
December 2018
ARTICLE

Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts

Volume 14, Number 2, December 2018, Pages 84–111
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v14i2.505
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Abstract

Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality (more specifically, they capture the connection between attributions of rationality and praise and criticism).
Copyright © 2018 Javier González de Prado Salas
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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