Volume 22, Number 1
May 2022
ARTICLE

Moral Decision Guides: Counsels of Morality or Counsels of Rationality?

Volume 22, Number 1, May 2022, Pages 35–46
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v22i1.1550
PDFPDF

Abstract

In a two-tiered, or Dual Oughts, moral theory, the objective account of right and wrong is supplemented by decision guides (such as “Maximize expected value”) designed to enable an agent, uncertain about the circumstances or consequences of her possible actions, to indirectly apply the objective theory by using an appropriate decision guide. But are the decision guides counsels of morality or counsels of rationality? Peter Graham argues they are counsels of pragmatic rationality. This paper shows Graham’s view is unsuccessful, and argues, based on the approach recently developed elsewhere, that decision guides must be seen as moral principles. An explanation is provided for why we may be tempted to interpret decision guides as principles of rationality.
Copyright © 2022 Holly M. Smith
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Rationality and Responding to Normative Reasons

Mohamad Hadi Safaei

Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries

Olof Leffler

Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts

Javier González de Prado Salas

Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori

Daniel Whiting

A Unified Moral Terrain?

Stephen Everson

Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise

Joseph Raz

Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz

John Broome

Instrumental Rationality: Not Dead Yet

David Sobel

Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency

John Brunero

The Myth of Instrumental Rationality

Joseph Raz

Uncertainty and Intention

Benjamin Lennertz

No Grit Without Freedom

Berislav Marušić

Portico