Agency, Stability, and Permeability in "Games"

Elisabeth Camp

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v23i3.2707

Volume 23, Number 3
January 2023

SYMPOSIUM

Agency, Stability, and Permeability in “Games”

Volume 23, Number 3, January 2023, Pages 448–462

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v23i3.2707

PDF

Abstract

In “Games and the Art of Agency,” Thi Nguyen argues that games both highlight and foster a profound complexity in human motivation, in the form of “purposeful and managed agential disunity.” I agree that human agency is “fluid and fleeting” rather than stable and unified; but I argue that Nguyen’s analysis itself relies on a traditional conception of selves as enduring goal-driven agents which his discussion calls into question. Without this conception, games look more like life, and both look riskier, than we might otherwise hope.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.

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