Volume 18, Number 2
August 2020
ARTICLE

The Trouble with Formal Views of Autonomy

Volume 18, Number 2, August 2020, Pages 173–210
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v18i2.852
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Abstract

Formal views of autonomy rule out substantive rational capacities (reasons-responsiveness) as a condition of autonomous agency. I argue that such views face a number of underappreciated problems: they have trouble making sense of how autonomous agents could be robustly responsible for their choices, face the burden of explaining why there should be a stark distinction between the importance of factual and evaluative information within autonomous agency, and leave it mysterious why autonomy is the sort of thing that has value and ought to be promoted. Moreover, I argue that the alternative view that includes substantive rational capacities need not have the unacceptable political implications it is sometimes thought to have.
Copyright © 2020 Jonathan Knutzen
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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