Volume 27, Number 1
March 2024
ARTICLE

The Procedure of Morality

and
Volume 27, Number 1, March 2024, Pages 180–209
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i1.2614
PDFPDF

Abstract

Does morality have a procedure? Unlike law, morality is arguably neither posited nor institutional. Thus, while morality undeniably prescribes various procedures, that morality itself has a procedure is less obvious. Indeed, the coexistence of procedural moral norms alongside substantive moral norms might seem paradoxical, given that they often yield contradictory prescriptions. After all, one may wonder, is morality not substantive all the way down? Nevertheless, the paper argues that morality has a “procedural branch” containing numerous norms that are themselves procedural. These norms comprise what we hold are the three hallmarks of a procedural norm: second-orderness, providing reasons on how to engage with other norms, and outcome-neutrality. In this respect, morality is more like law than what one might have expected.
Copyright © 2024 Ori J. Herstein and Ofer Malcai
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Grounding Human Rights in Political Conceptions

Bosko Tripkovic

Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries

Olof Leffler

Forgiveness and Negative Partiality

Joshua Stuchlik Brandt

Resolution and Resolve: Rationally Resisting Temptation

Abigail Bruxvoort

Naturalizing Moral Naturalism

Jessica Isserow

The Trouble with Formal Views of Autonomy

Jonathan Knutzen

The Normative Pluriverse

Matti Eklund

Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection

Daniele Bruno

Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts

Javier González de Prado Salas

Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action?

Hille Paakkunainen

On Promoting the Dead Certain: A Reply to Behrends, DiPaolo and Sharadin

Stefan Fischer

Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name Is False

Spencer Case

Portico