Volume 10, Number 1
April 2016
DISCUSSION

Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?

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Volume 10, Number 1, April 2016, Pages 1–10
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v10i1.183
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Abstract

Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
Copyright © 2016 Daan Evers and Bart Streumer
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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