Volume 24, Number 1
February 2023
ARTICLE

Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory

Volume 24, Number 1, February 2023, Pages 102–118
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v24i1.1922
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Abstract

According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections,” according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact.
Copyright © 2023 François Jaquet
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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