Volume 4, Number 1
January 2010
DISCUSSION

Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality

Volume 4, Number 1, January 2010, Pages 1–9
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v4i1.130
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Abstract

Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative
Copyright © 2010 Jonathan Way
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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