DISCUSSION
Fittingness and Good Reasoning
Volume 16, Number 2, November 2019, Pages 133–143
PDFAbstract
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.
Copyright © 2019 John Brunero
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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