Volume 18, Number 3
September 2020
ARTICLE

Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to May

Volume 18, Number 3, September 2020, Pages 289–297
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v18i3.614
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Abstract

May argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter the implausibility thesis). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that pace May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an issue for the moral skeptic; she has an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. Thus, we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis.
Copyright © 2020 Jimmy Alfonso Licon
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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