Volume 16, Number 2
November 2019
ARTICLE

What’s New About Fake News?

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Volume 16, Number 2, November 2019, Pages 67–94
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i2.629
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Abstract

The term “fake news” ascended rapidly to prominence in 2016 and has become a fixture in academic and public discussions, as well as in political mud-slinging. In the flurry of discussion, the term has been applied so broadly as to threaten to render it meaningless. In an effort to rescue our ability to discuss—and combat—the underlying phenomenon that triggered the present use of the term, some philosophers have tried to characterize it more precisely. A common theme in this nascent philosophical discussion is that contemporary fake news is not a new kind of phenomenon, but just the latest iteration of a broader kind of phenomenon that has played out in different ways across the history of human information-dissemination technologies. While we agree with this, we argue that newer sorts of fake news reveal substantial flaws in earlier understandings of this notion. In particular, we argue that no deceptive intentions are necessary for fake news to arise; rather, fake news arises when stories which were not produced via standard journalistic practice are treated as though they had been. Importantly, this revisionary understanding of fake news allows us to accommodate and understand the way that fake news is plausibly generated and spread in a contemporary setting, as much by non-human actors as by ordinary human beings.
Copyright © 2019 Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson, and Rachel Katharine Sterken
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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