Posthumous Repugnancy

Benjamin Kultgen

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v22i3.1730

Volume 22, Number 3
September 2022

ARTICLE

Posthumous Repugnancy

Volume 22, Number 3, September 2022, Pages 317–337

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v22i3.1730

PDF

Abstract

I argue that the possibility of posthumous harm ought to be rejected. My argument centers on a kind of repugnancy case involving posthumous harm. Supposing the existence of posthumous harm, a person whose wellbeing was extremely high while she was alive could incur small posthumous harms over a long enough period such that it is true of that person that she had a life not worth living. I respond to various objections and in the end conclude that rejecting posthumous harm is preferable to all other options.

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