Volume 18, Number 2
August 2020
ARTICLE

The Normative Pluriverse

Volume 18, Number 2, August 2020, Pages 121–146
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v18i2.652
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Abstract

According to a certain pluralist view in philosophy of mathematics, there are as many mathematical objects as there can coherently be. Recently, Justin Clarke-Doane has explored what consequences the analogous view on normative properties would have. What if there is a normative pluriverse? Here I address this same question. The challenge is best seen as a challenge to an important form of normative realism. I criticize the way Clarke-Doane presents the challenge. An improved challenge is presented, and the role of pluralism in this challenge is assessed.
Copyright © 2020 Matti Eklund
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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