"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent

Benjamin Kiesewetter

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i3.57

Volume 5, Number 3
November 2011

ARTICLE

“Ought” and the Perspective of the Agent

Volume 5, Number 3, November 2011, Pages 1–25

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i3.57

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Abstract

Objectivists and perspectivists disagree about the question of whether what an agent ought to do depends on the totality of facts or on the agent’s limited epistemic perspective. While objectivism fails to account for normative guidance, perspectivism faces the challenge of explaining phenomena (occurring most notably in advice, but also in first-personal deliberation) in which the use of ‘ought’ is geared to evidence that is better than the evidence currently available to the agent. This paper aims to defend perspectivism by developing a perspectivist account that captures the phenomena in question.

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