Volume 8, Number 1
August 2014
ARTICLE

Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori

Volume 8, Number 1, August 2014, Pages 1–23
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v8i1.77
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Abstract

Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspective. After explaining and establishing this point, I offer a novel account of subjective reasons that avoids the problem.
Copyright © 2014 Daniel Whiting
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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