Volume 12, Number 1
September 2017
ARTICLE

Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action?

Volume 12, Number 1, September 2017, Pages 56–93
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i1.213
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Abstract

I defend the relatively orthodox view that reasons for action are premises in good practical reasoning, against recent counterexamples that suggest that, like “government house” moral justifications, some reasons are to be ignored in deliberation. I also explain, positively, what is right about the orthodoxy. Unless reasons are premises in good practical reasoning, reasons cannot be normative in the way they are usually taken to be, and relatedly, are unfit to play certain familiar theoretical and related everyday roles that give many appeals to reasons their distinctive point.
Copyright © 2017 Hille Paakkunainen
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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