Volume 28, Number 2
August 2024
ARTICLE

On Giving Yourself a Sign

Volume 28, Number 2, August 2024, Pages 171–207
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i2.2400
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Abstract

I argue we can have subjective practical reasons to perform actions we believe are neither morally required nor a means to satisfy our intrinsic desires. These reasons are grounded in extrinsic desires. Specifically, my claim is that subjective practical reasons can be grounded in desires for signs (i.e., signatory desires), a species of extrinsic desire, together with means-end beliefs. These reasons act like any other subjective practical reason, except when they are trumped, which I argue can happen when they are competition with a subjective practical reasons grounded in intrinsic desire.
Copyright © 2024 Justin Dealy
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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