Volume 21, Number 2
February 2022
DISCUSSION

On the Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Rights

Volume 21, Number 2, February 2022, Pages 282–289
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v21i2.1304
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Abstract

Some scholars working on the ethics of paternalism are interested in whether there is a systematic normative connection between hard paternalism and people’s moral rights. One affirmative view is that hard paternalism is pro tanto wrong inasmuch as it always involves a rights infringement. Daniel Groll defends this view on the grounds that hard paternalism always infringes a competent adult’s right to be the only one to act only (or overridingly) for his own good. I call this right the right to self-beneficence. In this note, I argue that Groll misidentifies a right that competent adults have. Rather than the right to self-beneficence, I argue that if hard paternalism infringes any particular right, it is a right that a competent adult has against others “taking over” matters that fall within his sphere of legitimate agency or, by extension, the legitimate exercise of his agency. I call this right the right against legitimate agency interference.
Copyright © 2022 Stephanie Sheintul
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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