Volume 30, Number 3
May 2025
ARTICLE

Rights Infringement, Compensation, and Luck Egalitarianism

Volume 30, Number 3, May 2025, Pages 379–416
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v30i3.4137
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Abstract

This paper presents two arguments against the compensation thesis—the proposition that an agent who infringes on another’s moral claim right acquires a remedial duty to compensate the latter for any costs imposed by the infringement. First, it argues that rejecting the compensation thesis is the best way to resolve a trilemma that arises in cases where an agent blamelessly infringes on another’s claim. Second, the paper argues that the thesis is incompatible with (a plausible interpretation of) luck egalitarianism. Thus, those who accept the thesis will find their position yoked to the controversial rejection of (a plausible interpretation of) an influential theory of distributive justice. Finally, the paper considers and rejects six quick arguments in favor of accepting the compensation thesis.
Copyright © 2025 Jesse Spafford
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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