Volume 27, Number 3
May 2024
ARTICLE

Probability, Normalcy, and the Right Against Risk Imposition

Volume 27, Number 3, May 2024, Pages 505–524
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i3.3092
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Abstract

Many philosophers accept that, as well as having a right that others not harm us, we also have a right that others not subject us to a risk of harm. And yet, when we attempt to spell out precisely what this ‘right against risk imposition’ involves, we encounter a series of notorious puzzles. Existing attempts to deal with these puzzles have tended to focus on the nature of rights—but I propose an approach that focusses instead on the nature of risk. The key move is to distinguish two different ways in which to conceptualize the risk that a given action presents—one of which is linked to the notion of probability and the other to the notion of normalcy.
Copyright © 2024 Martin Smith
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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