Volume 2, Number 3
November 2008
DISCUSSION

Is Kantian Ethics Self-Refuting? A Reply to Millgram

Volume 2, Number 3, November 2008, Pages 1–6
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v2i3.122
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Abstract

Elijah Millgram has argued that Kantian ethics is self-refuting: if the universalization test is subjected to its own standard, it will fail to universalize, making it unacceptable. This short reply argues that Kantian ethics is not self-refuting in this way. The issue hangs on whether when Kantian agents treat their maxims as capable of having the form of law, they also adopt their maxims as exceptionless policies for living.
Copyright © 2008 Joshua Glasgow
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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