Volume 23, Number 2
November 2022
ARTICLE

Forgiving the Mote in Your Sister’s Eye: On Standingless Forgiveness

Volume 23, Number 2, November 2022, Pages 248–272
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v23i2.1957
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Abstract

Many philosophers analyzing standing to blame have argued that a hypocrite can lack standing to blame someone even if what that person did is blameworthy, and that standingless, hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrongful. Philosophers have yet to address the issue of standing to forgive. In this article, I defend two main claims. I argue first that if these two claims about blame are true, then so are the two corresponding claims about forgiveness: a hypocritical forgiver can lack standing to forgive someone for an act even if there are reasons to hold that this act is forgivable, and standingless, hypocritical forgiveness is pro tanto morally wrongful. I then argue, separately, that these two claims about forgiveness are true.
Copyright © 2022 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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