Volume 16, Number 1
September 2019
ARTICLE

The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame

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Volume 16, Number 1, September 2019, Pages 25–43
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i1.654
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Abstract

Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far overlooked, norm governing our attributions of responsibility. Accordingly, our aim in this paper is to develop a comparative non-arbitrariness condition on blame that can enrich our understanding of the ethics of blame.
Copyright © 2019 Daniel Telech and Hannah Tierney
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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