Volume 13, Number 1
March 2018
DISCUSSION

Does Contrary-Forming Predicate Negation Solve the Negation Problem?

Volume 13, Number 1, March 2018, Pages 73–79
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v13i1.346
PDFPDF

Abstract

Solving expressivism’s Frege-Geach problem requires specifying the attitudes expressed by arbitrarily complex moral sentences. Nicholas Unwin emphasizes the problems that arise in doing so for even the relatively simple case of negated atomic sentences. Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons believe that contrary-forming predicate negation offers a solution to this negation problem. I argue that their solution is incomplete.
Copyright © 2018 Robert Mabrito
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

The Goal Problem in the “Now What” Problem

Xinkan Zhao

Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge

David Faraci

On the Metaphysics of Relation-Response Properties; or, Why You Shouldn’t Collapse Response-Dependent Properties into Their Grounds

Spencer M. Smith

Alienation and the Metaphysics of Normativity: On the Quality of Our Relations with the World

Jack Samuel

Toward a Perceptual Solution to Epistemological Objections to Nonnaturalism

Preston Werner

Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism

John Hawthorne

All Reasons Are Fundamentally for Attitudes

Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way

An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke

David Killoren

What Normativity Cannot Be

Matthew S. Bedke

The Eligibility of Rule Utilitarianism

David Mokriski

Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection

Daniele Bruno

Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination

Marius Baumann

Portico