Volume 5, Number 2
October 2011
DISCUSSION

The Failure of Brown’s New Supervenience Argument

Volume 5, Number 2, October 2011, Pages 1–8
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i2.145
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Abstract

In 1998, Frank Jackson advanced an influential argument against the existence of irreducible ethical properties. Campbell Brown has recently offered what he describes as a new and improved version of this argument. Meanwhile, a metaethical view sometimes called “robust normative realism” has attracted a number of contemporary defenders. Robust normative realists maintain that at least some normative properties are not fully reducible to properties of some other kind. If Brown’s argument is sound, then robust normative realism is false. I argue here that Brown’s argument fails.
Copyright © 2011 Erik J. Wielenberg
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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