Volume 8, Number 3
January 2015
ARTICLE

Harm

Volume 8, Number 3, January 2015, Pages 1–33
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v8i3.84
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Abstract

In recent years, philosophers have proposed a variety of accounts of the nature of harm. In this paper, I consider several of these accounts and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then make a modest case for a different view.
Copyright © 2015 Michael Rabenberg
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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