Volume 9, Number 2
September 2015
DISCUSSION

Internalism, Ideal Advisors and the Conditional Fallacy

Volume 9, Number 2, September 2015, Pages 1–8
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v9i2.175
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Abstract

In her recent article, “Internalism About Reasons: Sad But True?” Kate Manne offers a brilliant defense of a novel version of internalism about normative reasons. But I will argue that this defense is not successful. After explaining the nature of Manne’s internalism, I offer two counterexamples to it, thereby showing that her argument in its favor goes wrong somewhere. I then identify the false premise in her argument. In brief, I suggest that Manne’s “practice-based approach” to practical normativity (or at least, to normative reasons) should be rejected.
Copyright © 2015 Alexander Hyun
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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