Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits

Andrew T. Forcehimes

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v15i2.644

Volume 15, Number 2
June 2019

DISCUSSION

Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits

Volume 15, Number 2, June 2019, Pages 175–185

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v15i2.644

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Abstract

One vexing question for Desire Satisfactionism is this: At what time do you benefit from a satisfied desire? Recently Eden Lin has proposed an intriguing answer. On this proposal—Asymmetrism—when past-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the desire; and, when future-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the object. In this essay, I argue that Asymmetrism forces us to give implausible answers to a different question: To what extent does a given satisfied desire benefit you?

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