The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments Against Judgment Subjectivism

Anthony Kelley

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.886

Volume 19, Number 3
March 2021

ARTICLE

The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments Against Judgment Subjectivism

Volume 19, Number 3, March 2021, Pages 291–310

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.886

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Abstract

Judgment subjectivism is the view that x is good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that S believes, under the proper conditions, that x is good for S. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the well-being of welfare nihlists, people who do not believe that there are any welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihlists can be benefited and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise.

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