The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons

David Sobel

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517

Volume 15, Number 2
June 2019

ARTICLE

The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons

Volume 15, Number 2, June 2019, Pages 146–174

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517

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Abstract

Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor one’s well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reason to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seems an obvious counterexample. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance-independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste, our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.

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